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INTRODUCTION
It would be hard to exaggerate the importance of the unconscionability
doctrine to federal arbitration law. In the last three decades, as the Supreme
Court has expanded the scope of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),1
arbitration clauses have become a routine part of consumer, franchise, and
employment contracts. Some companies have sought not just to funnel
cases away from courts, but to tilt the scales of justice in their favor:
stripping remedies, slashing discovery, selecting biased arbitrators,
eliminating the right to bring a class action, and saddling adherents with
prohibitive costs and fees.2 The unconscionability doctrine has emerged as
the primary check on drafter overreaching. The Court has repeatedly
acknowledged that lower courts can invoke unconscionability to invalidate
one-sided arbitration provisions,3 and dozens (perhaps hundreds) of judges
have done exactly that.4
Recently, however, a rising chorus of voices has argued that the FAA
allows arbitrators, but not judges, to strike down arbitration clauses as
unconscionable.5 These critics make three main points. First, they argue that
the FAA, which limits judicial discretion, is incompatible with
unconscionability, which is one of the most subjective and amorphous rules
1

Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006)).
For specific examples, see David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 460
(2011).
3
See, e.g., Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).
4
See, e.g., David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral Amendments,
57 UCLA L. REV. 605, 658 (2010).
5
See, e.g., Petitioner’s Reply Brief at 12–16, Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772
(2010) (No. 09-497); Stephen Friedman, Arbitration Provisions: Little Darlings and Little Monsters,
79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2035, 2067 (2011).
2
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in all of law.6 Second, they assert that Congress recognized that the statute
might allow powerful drafters to exploit weaker parties, but nevertheless
concluded that its benefits outweighed this risk.7 Third, they seize upon a
seeming discrepancy at the heart of the statute. Section 2’s savings clause
permits courts to invalidate arbitration clauses under “such grounds as exist
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract”8—a phrase that
arguably encompasses all contract defenses, including unconscionability.
Yet § 4 only allows judges to hear challenges to the “making of the
agreement for arbitration.”9 Unconscionability revolves, in part, around
substantive fairness, not the “making” of the arbitration clause. Thus, the
claim proceeds, because unconscionability does not fall within § 4, judges
cannot employ the rule.10 I will call this group of arguments the “anti-court”
theory.
The anti-court theory took on a new dimension in April 2011, when the
U.S. Supreme Court held in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion that the
FAA preempts a California Supreme Court rule that had rendered most
class arbitration waivers in consumer contracts unconscionable.11 The logic
in Justice Scalia’s majority opinion—that the California law is inconsistent
with the “purposes and objectives” of the FAA—earned the support of only
three other Justices. Although Justice Thomas “reluctantly” joined the
majority opinion, he wrote separately to explain that he believes § 4
restricts § 2’s savings clause to defenses that relate to the “making” of the
arbitration provision.12 In other words, Justice Thomas adopted one of the
anti-court theory’s premises, but arrived at a different, more drastic
conclusion: whereas the anti-court theory posits that judges cannot apply
unconscionability to arbitration clauses, Justice Thomas implied that
nobody can apply unconscionability to arbitration clauses.13 I will call this
the “anti-unconscionability” theory. Because Justice Thomas provided the
swing vote in Concepcion and invited parties to address the link between
§§ 2 and 4 in the future,14 he ensured that unconscionability’s viability will
become a flashpoint in the arbitration wars.
6
See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 5, at 2050 (“[T]he whole point of the FAA is to take arbitration
provisions out of the doghouse by removing judicial discretion when it comes to their enforcement.”).
7
See, e.g., id. at 2051.
8
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
9
Id. § 4.
10
Petitioner’s Reply Brief, supra note 5, at 13 (“Treating unconscionability as relevant to whether
an arbitration agreement has been ‘made’ is . . . inconsistent with the text of Section 4 . . . .”).
11
131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011).
12
See id. at 1753–55 (Thomas, J., concurring).
13
See infra Part III.C (explaining why I read Justice Thomas’s opinion to suggest that the modern
unconscionability doctrine is not a proper defense to an arbitration clause).
14
See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1754 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that this issue “could
benefit from briefing and argument in an appropriate case”). In fact, pro-business litigants and amici had
already been pushing this theory hard. See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of Distinguished Law Professors in
Support of Petitioner at 31 n.7, Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (No. 09-893); Petition for Writ of Certiorari
at 14–15, Cellco P’ship v. Litman, 131 S. Ct. 2872 (2010) (No. 10-398), 2010 WL 3700269, at *15.
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This Essay challenges the anti-court and anti-unconscionability
theories. First, it argues that the anti-court theory is impossible to square
with the FAA. The statute’s core provision, § 2, only validates arbitration
clauses if they do not violate “grounds . . . for the revocation of any
contract.”15 As the Court has acknowledged, unconscionability is one such
ground.16 Section 2 thus predicates arbitration on the existence of an
arbitration clause that is not unconscionable. The anti-court theory does not
comply with this sensible mandate because it requires judges to compel
arbitration even when faced with a flagrantly unconscionable (and thus
unenforceable) arbitration clause.
Second, this Essay debunks the idea, common to both the anti-court
and anti-unconscionability theories, that § 4 restricts § 2’s defenses to those
that relate to the “making” of the arbitration clause. Focusing exclusively
on the statute’s text, as Justice Thomas purported to do, actually
demonstrates that § 2 preserves all contract doctrines that can be grounds
for the rescission of an agreement. Although § 2 excludes one variation of
unconscionability, a rule I call “equitable” unconscionability, it embraces
the modern unconscionability doctrine that courts actually apply to
arbitration clauses. Thus, the statute neither strips judges of the power to
apply unconscionability nor excludes unconscionability completely.
I. UNCONSCIONABILITY AND THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
Today, most courts and scholars think of unconscionability as a single
monolithic doctrine. In this Part, I show that in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, unconscionability actually consisted of several discrete
principles. Then, I describe how the passage of the FAA made the precise
contours of unconscionability one of the most important and contentious
issues in federal arbitration law.
A. Pre-FAA Unconscionability
Before the twentieth century, most judges described contracts as
unconscionable if they were too one-sided to specifically enforce. As the
Michigan Supreme Court succinctly put it: “Specific performance is a
remedy of grace, rather than right, and will be refused where it is
inequitable to grant it.”17 Even a modest degree of unfairness could trigger
this manifestation of the rule. For example, one court denied specific
performance of a deal to sell a tract of land for $14,000 because its fair
market value was $15,000.18 I will call this equitable unconscionability.
Judges also used another variation of unconscionability to limit the
damages available in an action at law. This version of the rule required a
15
16
17
18

390

9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
See, e.g., Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686–87 (1996).
Rathbone v. Groh, 100 N.W. 588, 591 (Mich. 1904) (citations omitted).
See Wilson v. White, 119 P. 895, 900 (Cal. 1911).
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stronger showing of injustice than equitable unconscionability. For
example, in Hume v. United States, the federal government argued that a
contract calling for it to purchase shucks for thirty-five times their market
price was unconscionable.19 The Supreme Court agreed, and awarded the
seller nothing more than the reasonable value of the shucks.20 As the Court
explained, the agreement was “fraudulent” because it was “such as no man
in his senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no
honest and fair man would accept on the other.”21 Because judges in these
cases held that the consideration was so imbalanced that fraud was intrinsic
to the exchange, I will refer to it as the “intrinsic fraud” rule.
Finally, courts employed a third version of unconscionability to nullify
entire contracts. These cases featured two elements. First, because of a flaw
in the contracting process—“imbecility,” intoxication, old age, or a
language barrier—one party could not fully understand the bargain.22 This
component distinguished the rule from intrinsic fraud, which was available
even to sophisticated parties with bargaining power.23 Second, this
manifestation of unconscionability required the terms of the agreement to
be harsh or “improvident.”24 Although the opinions are inconsistent, the
degree of unfairness sufficient to rescind a contract generally was greater
than that required for equitable unconscionability, but was less than that
necessary for intrinsic fraud.25 As with intrinsic fraud, though, the basis of
the rule was that one party had not given her authentic, autonomous assent
to the transaction.26 I will describe this doctrine as “rescission”
unconscionability.
Before the twentieth century, courts did not apply the
unconscionability doctrine in any of its incarnations to arbitration clauses.
But as I describe next, two major developments—the enactment of the FAA
and the rise of standard form contracts—would pit arbitration and
unconscionability against each other.
B. The FAA
In 1925, Congress passed the FAA.27 The statute sought to override the
deep-seated suspicion of arbitration that American courts had inherited
19
20
21
22

132 U.S. 406, 414 (1889).
Id. at 415.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
See, e.g., Harris v. Wamsley, 41 Iowa 671, 673 (1875); Miller v. Howard, 184 P. 773, 775 (Okla.

1919).
23
For example, as noted above, Hume applied the intrinsic fraud rule even though the party
invoking the rule was the federal government, which enjoys ample bargaining muscle. See Hume, 132
U.S. at 414–15.
24
Harris, 41 Iowa at 673.
25
See, e.g., Bride v. Reeves, 40 App. D.C. 473, 478–79 (1913).
26
See, e.g., Barnes v. Waterman, 104 N.Y.S. 685, 687 (Sup. Ct. 1907) (annuity contracts were
unconscionable because one party did not “fully and clearly understand the[ir] terms”).
27
9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006).
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along with the common law.28 In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
English courts had invented unique rules to prevent litigants from settling
disputes outside of the judicial system. Under the ouster doctrine, they
invalidated arbitration clauses as improper attempts to override their
jurisdiction.29 And under the rule of revocability, courts allowed parties to
retract their consent to arbitrate until the very moment that the arbitrator
rendered an award.30 The FAA abolished these anti-arbitration measures.
Section 2, the statute’s “centerpiece,”31 instructs courts that they can only
use traditional contract principles—not the ouster or revocability
doctrines—to nullify a contract to arbitrate: “A written provision in . . . a
contract . . . to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of
such a contract . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.”32
Yet the FAA did not cut judges out of the loop completely. If a dispute
arises about the “making of the agreement for arbitration,” § 4 tasks courts
(or juries) with resolving it.33 For reasons that will become apparent, I will
quote § 4 in detail later.
C. Modern Unconscionability
Decades after the FAA’s enactment, courts and scholars struggled to
assimilate the standard form (or “adhesion contract”) into contract law.
These nonnegotiated, unilaterally drafted documents reduced transaction
costs.34 At the same time, though, they threatened to undermine the very
definition of a contract. Although binding agreements supposedly arose
from words or conduct that each party could reasonably construe as assent
to the exchange, drafters knew that few (if any) adherents would read the
boilerplate. As a result, standard forms—particularly self-serving provisions
in standard forms—did not seem to meet the minimum standards for
contract formation.35
Courts and policymakers responded, in part, by revamping the
unconscionability doctrine. In the mid-1960s, building on the foundation
laid by “rescission” unconscionability, they created an unconscionability
28
See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (explaining that the
FAA’s “purpose was to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had
existed at English common law and had been adopted by American courts”).
29
See, e.g., Kill v. Hollister, (1746) 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (K.B.) (“[T]he agreement of the parties
cannot oust this Court . . . .”).
30
See, e.g., Vynior’s Case, (1609) 77 Eng. Rep. 597 (K.B.); 80 Co. Rep. 81 b (holding that parties
could withdraw their consent to arbitrate at any time before the arbitrator ruled).
31
Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 593 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
32
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
33
Id. § 4.
34
See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.8, at 115 (6th ed. 2003).
35
See, e.g., KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370–71
(1960).
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rule tailored to standard forms. This doctrine, which I will call “modern”
unconscionability, consists of the two-pronged test that prevails in most
jurisdictions today.36 Procedural unconscionability hinges on the
circumstances surrounding contract formation, such as whether a provision
was offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis or buried in fine print.37
Substantive unconscionability arises when a term is “overly-harsh” or “onesided.”38 By allowing courts to invalidate terms that suffer from these
defects, modern unconscionability penalizes drafters for overreaching and
maintains judicial integrity.39 But more importantly, it isolates terms to
which adherents do not assent in any meaningful way. As the D.C. Circuit
explained in the watershed case Williams v. Walker–Thomas Furniture Co.:
“[W]hen a party of little bargaining power, and hence little real choice,
signs a commercially unreasonable contract with little or no knowledge of
its terms, it is hardly likely that his consent, or even an objective
manifestation of his consent, was ever given to all the terms.”40 Indeed,
modern unconscionability empowers courts to strike down provisions that
“fall outside the ‘circle of assent’ which constitutes the actual agreement.”41
When the Court expanded the scope of the FAA in the mid-1980s, it
transformed modern unconscionability into the most important—and
controversial—doctrine in federal arbitration law. Responding to the
Court’s pro-arbitration jurisprudence, companies of all sizes placed
arbitration clauses in their standard form contracts.42 Often these provisions
not only required the parties to bypass the judicial system, they also created
an alternative procedural regime that favored the drafter.43 Courts annulled
so many of these clauses that modern unconscionability became defined
largely by its role in the arbitration context.44 In turn, this entanglement with
arbitration created a new problem. On the one hand, the overwhelming
consensus among judges and commentators—reinforced by dicta in several
36
See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-302 (2011) (recognizing modern unconscionability); Arthur Allen Leff,
Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s ew Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 541 (1967)
(tracing the drafting history of the U.C.C.’s unconscionability provision and criticizing the rule for its
“definitional void”).
37
See, e.g., David Horton, Unconscionability in the Law of Trusts, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1675,
1694–95 (2009) (collecting cases).
38
A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 122 (Ct. App. 1982) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
39
See Friedman, supra note 5, at 2043.
40
350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
41
A & M Produce, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 122 (footnote omitted).
42
See, e.g., Ellie Winninghoff, In Arbitration, Pitfalls for Consumers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1994,
at L37 (noting the pervasiveness of arbitration clauses).
43
See, e.g., Horton, supra note 2, at 460.
44
See, e.g., Charles L. Knapp, Blowing the Whistle on Mandatory Arbitration: Unconscionability
as a Signaling Device, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 609, 622 (2009) (noting the sharp rise in
unconscionability challenges to arbitration clauses in the last decade); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration,
Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The Return of Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to
Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 757, 804–08 (2004) (collecting cases that
illuminate the “renewed unconscionability-based scrutiny of arbitration clauses”).
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Court opinions—was that unconscionability was a “ground[] . . . for the
revocation of any contract” and thus could serve as a defense to an
arbitration clause under § 2.45 On the other hand, unconscionability was so
tied to arbitration that it seemed less like a traditional contract defense and
more like a specialized anti-arbitration measure. Scholars began to protest
that courts were manifesting a “new judicial hostility to arbitration” by
applying a stricter version of unconscionability to arbitration clauses.46 In
fact, Concepcion was the culmination of a long struggle by corporate
defendants to get the Court to review a lower court’s unconscionability
ruling that allegedly discriminated against arbitration.47
The anti-court and anti-unconscionability theories are the latest
embodiment of this pushback. I critique both in the next two Parts.
II. THE ANTI-COURT THEORY: ARBITRATION WITHOUT A VALID
ARBITRATION CLAUSE
Under the anti-court theory, arbitrators can apply unconscionability but
judges cannot. Before I address this thesis on its own terms, I will highlight
a reason why it cannot be correct: it would force courts to compel
arbitration before determining that a valid arbitration clause exists.
The Court often declares that arbitration is “a matter of contract.”48
Section 2 enshrines this principle by making a binding arbitration clause—
one that is not susceptible to “grounds . . . for the revocation of any
contract”49—the price of admission to arbitration. However, the anti-court
theory would send disputes to arbitration without insisting that the drafter
lay this foundation. For instance, Stephen Friedman, who endorses the anticourt theory in a brilliant article, argues that even judges faced with a
flagrantly unconscionable arbitration clause “must grit their teeth” and
compel arbitration.50 But that would allow arbitration to conjure itself out of
thin air. If an arbitration clause is blatantly unconscionable, it is
unenforceable under § 2 and there is no basis for arbitration.
There are two seeming exceptions to this principle, but neither goes as
far as the anti-court theory. First, the FAA requires courts to honor
“invalid” arbitration clauses because it preempts traditional contract law.
For instance, the Court has interpreted the statute to eradicate certain
45
E.g., Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006))
(internal quotation mark omitted); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987) (emphasis omitted)
(quoting § 2) (internal quotation mark omitted).
46
Steven J. Burton, The ew Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Federal Preemption, Contract
Unconscionability, and Agreements to Arbitrate, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 469, 470–71, 486.
47
Cf. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the Evolution
of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1466–68 (2008) (anticipating Concepcion by
noting the rise in petitions for certiorari that asked the Court to rule that a lower “court is using
unconscionability against arbitration clauses in ways it is not used in other contexts”).
48
Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776 (2010).
49
§ 2.
50
Friedman, supra note 5, at 2067.
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strands of the longstanding contract defense of violation of public policy.51
As a result, a court cannot strike down an arbitration clause just because a
state has a strong interest in guaranteeing a judicial forum for certain
claims. This may or may not be normatively desirable, but it flows naturally
from the fact that the FAA preempts any state law that obstructs its goals.
Critically, however, neither judges nor arbitrators can apply the public
policy defense in this manner—it is not a viable defense to an arbitration
clause. Conversely, the anti-court theory candidly acknowledges that
unconscionability is a permissible defense to an arbitration clause. Indeed,
even under the anti-court theory, unconscionability is a non-preempted
“ground[] . . . for the revocation of any contract” under § 2.52 Thus, when a
court enforces an unconscionable arbitration clause, it does not merely
uphold a term that would be invalid under quotidian contract law—it
upholds a term that is invalid under the FAA itself. The anti-court theory
cannot be squared with the statute it seeks to interpret.
Second, although the FAA allows arbitrators to decide gateway issues
about the arbitration itself, it does not permit a judge to enforce an
arbitration clause that triggers a non-preempted ground for revocation of
any contract. For instance, arbitrators can determine whether a particular
dispute falls within the scope of the clause. However, that is not the same as
determining whether the arbitration clause is valid under § 2. Similarly,
under the separability doctrine, courts must treat any contract that contains
an arbitration clause as two contracts: (1) the overarching agreement that
includes the arbitration clause (the “container contract”) and (2) the contract
to arbitrate.53 The separability doctrine permits arbitrators to resolve
allegations that the container contract is unenforceable.54 But when a party
specifically challenges the arbitration clause, a court decides the issue.55
Thus, even under the separability doctrine, arbitration cannot proceed
unless a judge has determined that the arbitration clause satisfies § 2.

51
See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 18–20 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (noting that by holding that the FAA preempts the right of states to deem certain
contracts void for violation of public policy, the Court has eradicated a “ground[] . . . for the revocation
of any contract” (quoting § 2) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
52
See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
53
See, e.g., Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395, 402 (1967) (compelling the
arbitration of a claim that one company fraudulently induced another company to enter into a consulting
agreement that included an arbitration clause); see also Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546
U.S. 440, 445 (2006) (“[A]s a matter of substantive federal arbitration law, an arbitration provision is
severable from the remainder of the contract.”).
54
Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 402.
55
See, e.g., Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 448–49. Admittedly, the contours of the separability doctrine are
hotly contested. Compare Alan Scott Rau, Everything You Really eed to Know About “Separability” in
Seventeen Simple Propositions, 14 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 14 (2003) (arguing courts are, in fact, able to
decide some claims that seek to invalidate the container contract), with Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration
Law’s Separability Doctrine After Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 8 NEV. L.J. 107, 121–23
(2007) (claiming that the separability rule is too broad and should be repealed). I am referring to the
doctrine as the Court seems to understand it in cases like Buckeye.
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Likewise, the Court’s recent decision in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v.
Jackson56 conditions arbitration on the existence of an arbitration clause that
a judge has vetted for the full range of non-preempted grounds for
revocation of any contract. In Rent-A-Center, the Court extended the
separability rule to so-called “delegation clauses,” which expressly
authorize the arbitrator to decide the very issue of whether the arbitration
clause is enforceable.57 The Court held that if a contract contains a
delegation clause, judges cannot decide whether the arbitration clause is
valid unless a party first overturns the delegation clause.58 But the Court
reached this conclusion by conceptualizing delegation clauses as standalone, mini-arbitration clauses within arbitration clauses within container
contracts: “an agreement to arbitrate threshold issues concerning the
arbitration agreement.”59 In other words, even if a contract contains a
delegation clause, a case does not proceed directly to arbitration. Rather, a
court must decide whether the delegation clause is valid under § 2.60 Again,
under no circumstances can drafters do what the anti-court theory would
permit them to do: completely end-run the judiciary by creating selfenforcing agreements to arbitrate.
Finally, the anti-court theory would have perverse results. It would
give arbitrators the exclusive right to decide whether an arbitration clause is
unconscionable even when the unfair features of the clause make it harder
to prove that the arbitration clause is unconscionable. Suppose the drafter
reserves the right to select the arbitrator. As the Fourth Circuit declared,
such an arrangement “ensure[s] a biased decisionmaker.”61 However,
without a prophylactic layer of court involvement, the biased decisionmaker
would preside over the claim in which she is biased. Of course, the law
tolerates self-interested adjudication when a judge must decide whether to
recuse herself, but judges are never unilaterally appointed by one party.
And unlike arbitrators, their rulings (both on recusal motions and the
merits) are subject to the full panoply of appellate review. Thus, by
allowing arbitrators complete dominion over their own neutrality, the anticourt theory encourages abuse. Similarly, if drafters impose exorbitant
arbitral costs or choose an inconvenient forum, the only way for consumers,
franchisees, or employees to obtain a ruling that these provisions are
unconscionable would be to endure the exact injustices—paying excessive
fees or travelling far away—that made the provisions unconscionable.
For these reasons, Congress did not exempt arbitration clauses from
unconscionability challenges in court. In the next Part, I examine the anticourt and anti-unconscionability theories in greater detail.
56
57
58
59
60
61
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130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010).
Id. at 2777.
Id. at 2780–81.
Id. at 2777.
See id. at 2777–78.
Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938 (4th Cir. 1999).
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III. THE FLAWED FOUNDATION OF THE ANTI-COURT AND ANTIUNCONSCIONABILITY THEORIES
As I mentioned at the outset of this Essay, anti-court proponents make
three main arguments. They contend that courts cannot apply
unconscionability to arbitration clauses because (1) unconscionability gives
judges too much discretion, (2) Congress passed the FAA even though it
recognized that stronger parties might foist arbitration on others, and (3)
unconscionability does not relate to the “making of the agreement to
arbitrate” under § 4.62
Although the anti-unconscionability theory is less developed, it maps
onto these assertions perfectly. Each argument drives a wedge between the
FAA and unconscionability, suggesting that unconscionability cannot be a
defense to an arbitration clause. Moreover, Justice Thomas’s concurrence in
Concepcion held that certain strands of unconscionability do not relate to
the “making” of the arbitration clause.
A. Judicial Discretion
According to the anti-court camp, there is tension between the FAA,
which eliminates judicial discretion in several areas, and unconscionability,
which gives judges wide leeway to do what they wish. Indeed, the FAA
severely limits the grounds on which courts can vacate, modify, or overrule
an arbitrator’s award.63 It also requires courts to stay litigation and compel
arbitration “in accordance with the terms of the agreement” if a dispute falls
within the scope of a valid arbitration clause.64 Unconscionability, on the
other hand, revolves around “fairness”—an utterly subjective norm—and
allows courts to annul some aspects of the arbitration clause while
upholding others. Moreover, the theory continues, Congress passed the
FAA to abolish the ancient judicial hostility to arbitration.65 Thus, it could
not have wanted courts to apply a doctrine that could easily camouflage the
same antagonism toward extrajudicial dispute resolution.
Yet this argument sweeps too broadly. Unconscionability is not the
only fact-sensitive, pliable rule that courts use to strike down arbitration
clauses (or portions of arbitration clauses). Consider the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. Judges have relied on the implied covenant to
nullify one-sided arbitral procedures66 and drafters’ attempts to unilaterally
add arbitration clauses to existing contracts.67 However, good faith—a
“chameleon” which lacks “a settled meaning”—is just as nebulous as
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65
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9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006).
Id. §§ 9–11.
Id. §§ 3, 4.
See Friedman, supra note 5, at 2051.
See, e.g., Hooters, 173 F.3d at 940.
See, e.g., Badie v. Bank of Am., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 284 (Ct. App. 1998).
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unconscionability,68 and no court, scholar, or litigant of whom I am aware
has argued that it is off limits to judges in the arbitration arena. Similarly,
courts routinely decide that a party has waived its right to arbitrate, even
though this issue involves a flexible, multi-factored balancing test.69 Even
the duress defense, which indisputably falls under § 2, is “amorphous”70 and
hinges on easily manipulated factors such as whether a threat is
“improper.”71
Thus, many rules aggrandize courts and yet remain capable of voiding
arbitration clauses. Unless Congress meant to create a nasty recurring linedrawing problem, the mere fact that a doctrine confers broad discretion on
judges does not mean that it is unavailable to them.
B. Contractual Overreaching
Anti-court theorists also claim that Congress was aware that the FAA
might allow stronger parties to impose arbitration on others, but ultimately
decided that its virtues trumped these shortcomings. These theorists focus
on two exchanges in the legislative history. First, Julius Henry Cohen, the
author of the FAA, testified that the revocability doctrine reflected the fact
that “the stronger men would take advantage of the weaker, and the courts
had to come in and protect them.”72 As anti-court proponents argue, because
Congress passed the FAA after Cohen flagged these concerns, it must have
determined “that simplicity and the desirability of enforcing arbitration
provisions outweighed . . . protect[ing] vulnerable parties.”73 Second,
Senator Sterling, the Subcommittee Chairman, quizzed Cohen about
railroad contracts offered on a “take it or leave it” basis.74 Cohen replied by
citing the governmental regulation of bills of lading and insurance contracts
as evidence that “people are protected to-day as never before.”75 However,
the anti-court theorists state that “[n]owhere in his answer does Cohen
indicate any role for courts in policing against overreaching contracts.”76
Yet it is not surprising that Cohen never mentioned that judges might
protect adherents. In 1925, they lacked the means to do so. Policymakers
68

Empire Gas Corp. v. Am. Bakeries Co., 840 F.2d 1333, 1339 (7th Cir. 1988).
See, e.g., Davis v. KB Home of S.C., Inc., 713 S.E.2d 799, 807 (S.C. Ct. App. 2011) (“There is
no set rule as to what constitutes a waiver of the right to arbitrate; the question depends on the facts of
each case.” (quoting Liberty Builders, Inc. v. Horton, 521 S.E.2d 749, 753 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999))
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
70
Andreini v. Hultgren, 860 P.2d 916, 920 n.4 (Utah 1993).
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Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary, 68th
Cong. 15 (1924) [hereinafter Joint Hearings] (statement of Julius Henry Cohen)) (internal quotation
mark omitted).
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Id. at 2051.
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See id. at 2051–52 (quoting Joint Hearings, supra note 72 (statement of Julius Henry Cohen)).
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had not started thinking about standard forms as part of a systemic problem.
Indeed, it had been just six years since Edwin Patterson had introduced the
phrase “contract of adhesion” to American legal commentary.77 As I have
argued above, the unconscionability doctrine was largely a way for courts
sitting in equity to refuse specific performance of one-sided contracts.
Modern unconscionability, which would have applied to the standard form
contracts that Cohen and Senator Sterling were discussing, did not emerge
until the mid-1960s.
Moreover, Congress never had to consider whether judges should
protect weaker parties because the FAA as enacted was much narrower than
it is today. Congress arguably passed the statute under its Commerce Clause
power.78 In 1925, however, Congress could not regulate intrastate
transactions.79 Thus, the FAA would have applied only to the rare adhesion
contract that was negotiated across state lines. Alternatively, some judges
and scholars believe that the FAA actually flowed from Congress’s
Article III authority to regulate federal courts.80 As a result, the statute
would have only governed in diversity cases, where the parties were
citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeded
$300081—criteria that would have excluded most consumer, employment,
and insurance agreements. Accordingly, Congress never faced the stark
choice between arbitration hegemony and protecting the rights of adherents
that the anti-court camp attributes to it.
Thus, the most plausible explanation for any silence in the record about
the role of courts is not that Congress intended to strip them of their ability
to act as a bulwark against powerful drafters. Rather, it is that Congress
assumed that the FAA applied largely to merchant-to-merchant transactions
and thus did not create a serious risk of exploitation.
C. The “Making” of the Arbitration Clause
Finally, both the anti-court and anti-unconscionability theories claim
that unconscionability does not fall within § 4. When a party moves to
compel arbitration, § 4 states that:
The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the
agreement for arbitration . . . is not in issue, the court shall make an order
directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of
the agreement. . . . If the making of the arbitration agreement . . . be in issue,
the court shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof. If no jury trial be
77

See Edwin W. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy, 33 HARV. L. REV. 198, 222

(1919).
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See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative History
of the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101, 106 (2002).
79
See id. at 127–28.
80
See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 28 (1984) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
81
See Drahozal, supra note 78, at 157 (quoting Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The ew
Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265, 267 (1926)).
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demanded by the party alleged to be in default, . . . the court shall hear and
determine such issue. Where such an issue is raised, the party alleged to be in
default may . . . demand a jury trial of such issue . . . . If the jury find that no
agreement in writing for arbitration was made . . . , the proceeding shall be
dismissed. If the jury find that an agreement for arbitration was made in
writing . . . , the court shall make an order summarily directing the parties to
proceed with the arbitration in accordance with the terms thereof.82

Thus, on its face, § 4 seems only to permit courts to resolve disputes about
the “making of the agreement for arbitration.”
This passage is key to the anti-court theory. For instance, Professor
Friedman argues that unconscionability does not relate to the “making” of
the arbitration clause. Instead, as he sees it, “the contract has been made and
we need to decide what to do with it.”83 Accordingly, he concludes that § 4
does not permit courts to entertain unconscionability challenges to
arbitration clauses. Rather, courts must order cases to arbitration and permit
the arbitrator to decide what to do with the potentially unconscionable
provision.84
Likewise, the phrase “making of the agreement for arbitration” is
central to the anti-unconscionability theory as set out in Justice Thomas’s
concurrence in Concepcion. The seeds of Concepcion were sown in 2005,
when the California Supreme Court held in Discover Bank v. Superior
Court that class arbitration waivers in consumer contracts could be
unconscionable when applied to numerous low-value claims.85 The state
high court reasoned that because plaintiffs will not prosecute such claims on
an individual basis, class arbitration waivers amount to “‘get out of jail free’
card[s]” for corporate liability.86 However, Concepcion held that the FAA
preempts Discover Bank.87 The four-Justice majority reasoned that class
arbitration is slower and more formal than bilateral arbitration.88 Thus, the
majority held that California’s attempt to guarantee such procedures for
low-value claimants through the unconscionability doctrine “stand[s] as an
obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives.”89
Nevertheless, Justice Thomas, a staunch textualist, has foresworn the
freewheeling “purposes and objectives” preemption that the majority
deployed.90 As a result, he “reluctantly” concurred and wrote separately to
explain how he reached the same result by applying the statute’s plain
82
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meaning.91 First, he noted that § 2 makes arbitration clauses “valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable,” but only makes them vulnerable to
“grounds . . . for the revocation of any contract.”92 This asymmetry led him
to conclude that § 2 does not apply to “all defenses applicable to any
contract but rather some subset of those defenses.”93 To determine which
defenses fit the bill, he looked to § 4:
When a party seeks to enforce an arbitration agreement in federal court, § 4
requires that “upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for
arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue,” the court must
order arbitration “in accordance with the terms of the agreement.”
Reading §§ 2 and 4 harmoniously, the “grounds . . . for the revocation”
preserved in § 2 would mean grounds related to the making of the agreement.94

Although Discover Bank claimed to apply the unconscionability
doctrine, Justice Thomas reasoned that it actually furthered California’s
interest in using the class action to deter corporate wrongdoing.95 Because it
centered on these extrinsic policy considerations rather than the “making”
of the arbitration provision, it was preempted.
More broadly, Justice Thomas’s concurrence implied that he does not
think that modern unconscionability is a defense to an arbitration clause.
For instance, he explained that §§ 2 and 4 require courts to enforce an
arbitration clause “unless a party successfully asserts a defense concerning
the formation of the agreement to arbitrate, such as fraud, duress, or mutual
mistake.”96 Unconscionability is conspicuously absent from that list. Then,
in a footnote, he cited Hume v. United States for the proposition that
unconscionability “historically concern[s] the making of an agreement.”97
As noted, Hume involved the intrinsic fraud rule, a precursor to modern
unconscionability. The fact that Justice Thomas interprets the FAA to allow
courts to utilize the intrinsic fraud rule does not necessarily mean that he
would extend that logic to modern unconscionability, which did not exist
when Congress passed the statute.
As I explain in the next subparts, I disagree with the anti-court and
anti-unconscionability theories’ view of these issues for three reasons. First,
I am not convinced by Justice Thomas’s conclusion that § 2 is ambiguous.
As a result, there is no reason to try to shoehorn § 4’s reference to the
“making” of the arbitration clause into § 2. Second, I do not believe that
Congress intended the word “making” to mean “formation.” As I explain,
this narrow reading would have undesirable consequences in other contexts,
91
92
93
94
95
96
97

Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1754 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)).
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Id. at 1754–55 (omission in original) (quoting § 4).
Id. at 1756.
Id. at 1755.
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such as the separability doctrine. Third, even if §§ 2 or 4 do, in fact, only
encompass defenses that relate to contract formation, modern
unconscionability satisfies this standard. Even the species of
unconscionability that Justice Thomas found preempted in Concepcion
preserves the role of mutual assent in adhesion contracts and thus falls
squarely within §§ 2 and 4.
1. The False Link Between §§ 2 and 4.—Unlike the anti-court theory,
which takes no position about the meaning of § 2, the antiunconscionability theory’s central premise is that § 2 is ambiguous. Indeed,
as Justice Thomas observed, § 2 is lopsided: it makes arbitration clauses
“valid, irrevocable, and enforceable” subject only to grounds for “the
revocation of any contract.”98 Thus, Justice Thomas looked to § 4 “[t]o
clarify the meaning of § 2.”99
However, with one caveat, I believe that § 2 is clear on its face. The
phrases on which Justice Thomas focused do two things. First, they abolish
the ouster and revocability rules. They do this by making arbitration clauses
“valid” (overruling the ouster doctrine) and “irrevocable” (eliminating the
revocability principle). Second, by making arbitration clauses
“enforceable,” they prohibit courts from denying specific performance.
Indeed, one of the FAA’s major purposes was to require courts to
automatically grant specific performance as the remedy for breach of an
arbitration clause.100 This need to make specific performance mandatory
explains half of the “ambiguity” that Justice Thomas identified: the
omission of the word “non-enforcement.” Section 2 could not have stated
that arbitration clauses are “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable” subject to
the grounds for the “revocation and non-enforcement of any contract.”
Doing so would have created a loophole that would have permitted courts
to continue to decline to specifically enforce arbitration clauses.
At this point, I want to acknowledge a corollary of my interpretation:
the FAA does not allow courts to apply the doctrine of equitable
unconscionability. By immunizing arbitration clauses from traditional
contract rules that are grounds for non-enforcement, the statute eclipses any
rule, including equitable unconscionability, that entitles judges to deny
specific performance. Thus, when Justice Thomas reasoned that § 2 “does
not include all defenses applicable to any contract but rather some subset of
those defenses,”101 he was exactly right. However, because equitable
unconscionability is only tenuously related to modern unconscionability,
this conclusion makes little practical difference. More importantly, once the
98
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“non-enforcement” puzzle is solved, § 2 contains only one true ambiguity:
it does not state that arbitration clauses are susceptible to grounds for
contractual “invalidity.”
There are several plausible explanations for the absence of
“invalidity.” The most likely contender is that, as Justice Thomas
acknowledged, “invalidity” and “revocation” mean the same thing.102
“Invalid” means “being without legal force.”103 “Revoke” means “to
void.”104 Because there is no difference between a contract that lacks legal
force and one that is void, a contract cannot be “invalid” unless it is
“revocable,” and vice versa. In fact, in the years leading up to the FAA’s
passage, courts often emphasized that an agreement was binding by calling
it “valid and irrevocable.”105 Congress could easily have determined that
“revocation” made “invalidity” superfluous.
Another possibility stems from the FAA’s drafting history. The first
glimmer of what would become § 2 can be found in a 1917 Illinois law that
provided that “[a] submission to arbitration shall . . . be irrevocable.”106
Although the statute only governed the arbitration of existing controversies
and not future disputes, it influenced Julius Henry Cohen, who reproduced
it verbatim in the appendix of his 1918 polemic Commercial Arbitration
and the Law.107 Cohen then borrowed the basic structure of the Illinois
legislation when he drafted New York’s landmark 1920 Arbitration Act,
which made arbitration clauses “valid, enforcible [sic] and irrevocable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
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contract.”108 Not only did ending the provision with “revocation” mirror the
Illinois law, but it made sense because the revocability doctrine was so
firmly established in New York that the legislature had seen fit to carve out
a limited exception to it in New York’s Code of Civil Procedure.109 It was
thus important to stress that the new Arbitration Act totally superseded the
revocability principle. Cohen copied the New York statute’s language in § 2
of the FAA. Accordingly, the FAA’s fixation on “grounds for revocation”
may simply be a historical accident.
However, Justice Thomas’s solution to the omission of “invalidity” in
§ 2—to import the phrase “the making of the agreement for arbitration”
from § 4—is not persuasive. To be sure, “[a] provision that may seem
ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory
scheme.”110 Yet there is no need to look outside the four corners of a
statutory provision unless it is actually ambiguous—susceptible to multiple
reasonable interpretations that would produce different outcomes when
applied to the same facts.111 The fact that Congress did not use the word
“invalidity” in § 2 is not a real ambiguity. As noted above, “revocation” and
“invalidity” are synonyms. Because § 2 already uses the term “revocation,”
it would generate the same results in cases with or without the word
“invalidity.” Thus, Justice Thomas’s justification for grafting language
from § 4 into § 2 is dubious.
Moreover, even if § 2 is ambiguous, Justice Thomas’s “clarification”
of it is a jarring non sequitur. There is no analytical relationship between
the symptom (the omission of the word “invalidity”) and the cure (limiting
§ 2 to defenses that relate to contract formation). Because the statute uses
the term “revocation,” and to “revoke” is “to void,” § 2 includes all
defenses that can void a contract. This is true whether the defenses relate to
contract formation (like fraud) or not (like public policy). The absence of
“invalidity” does not suggest that Congress meant something narrower than
“revocation” when it used the word “revocation.” By limiting the plain
meaning of “revocation” in § 2 by inserting language from § 4, Justice
Thomas did not “clarify” the statute. Rather, he contradicted it.
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In fact, the FAA’s legislative history elucidates that Congress believed
that § 2 applied to all defenses—not just those that center on formation. For
instance, Senator Walsh expressed his understanding that “[t]he court has
got to hear and determine whether there is an agreement of
arbitration . . . and it is open to all defenses, equitable and legal.”112
Similarly, in a law review article about the New York statute, Cohen wrote
that it “recognizes that the infirmities, common to all contracts, which
furnish ground for revocation at law or in equity, may still exist in cases of
arbitration agreements.”113 To be sure, Cohen used the word “revocation,”
but, as noted above, grounds for “revocation” include both formation and
non-formation-related defenses. And at the very least, if § 2 did, in fact,
only govern contract formation, there would have been some discussion of
this point in the congressional record. But there is none.
Accordingly, § 4 sheds no light on § 2. Of course, the fact that
“grounds for revocation” includes all contract defenses (other than those
that would be “grounds for non-enforcement”) does not mean that judges
can freely apply these rules. For instance, no court could invalidate an
arbitration clause because it believes that waiving the right to a jury trial
violates public policy. But contrary to Justice Thomas’s view, that result
does not stem from the language of § 2. Instead, it arises from the doctrine
of “purposes and objectives” preemption and the muscular proarbitration
policy that the Court created out of whole cloth. To be serious about
textualism is to acknowledge that the statute only preempts a sliver of
traditional contract doctrine.
2. “Making.”—Both the anti-court and anti-unconscionability
theories also claim that Congress used the phrase “the making of the
agreement for arbitration” in § 4 to mean the “formation” of the arbitration
clause. For instance, Professor Friedman argues that “[u]nconscionability
does not really go to the issue of whether a contract was made.”114 And as
noted above, Justice Thomas concluded that “[c]ontract defenses unrelated
to the making of the agreement . . . could not be the basis for declining to
enforce an arbitration clause.”115
However, these approaches rely too heavily on words that Congress
did not utilize with precision. For instance, § 4 requires a court to order
arbitration if “an agreement for arbitration was made in writing” but not if
“no agreement in writing for arbitration was made.”116 Similarly, a report
prepared by the House Committee on the Judiciary describes § 4 as offering
112
Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal Commercial
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“a method for the summary trial of any claim that no arbitration agreement
ever was made.”117 Read literally, these excerpts seem to require courts to
order arbitration if there is a piece of paper that purports to be an arbitration
clause. Indeed, an arbitration clause induced by egregious fraud has been
“made.” However, no one subscribes to this view. Thus, the fact that
Congress used “made” loosely militates against a hyper-literal reading of
“making.”
Moreover, if “making” meant only “formation,” it would have bizarre
consequences outside the narrow context of unconscionability. Section 4
also provides the textual root of the separability doctrine. As the Court has
explained, judges cannot hear challenges to the container contract because
§ 4 only permits them to resolve “issue[s] which go[] to the ‘making’ of the
agreement to arbitrate.”118 But if “making” is “formation,” then courts lack
jurisdiction to entertain challenges to the arbitration clause that do not relate
to the contracting process. Paradoxically, these would be the very claims—
that the arbitration provision is illegal or violates some non-preempted
strand of the public policy defense—that Congress was least likely to
entrust to arbitrators.
Finally, Professor Friedman buttresses his argument by noting that § 4
“is directed largely at safeguarding the right to trial by jury.”119 Indeed, that
provision repeatedly mentions the role of the jury in deciding whether to
compel arbitration. Because juries do not hear unconscionability challenges,
Professor Friedman concludes that § 4 does not permit courts to invoke the
rule.120
Nevertheless, § 4 does not vest in juries the exclusive right to
determine whether an arbitration clause was “made.” To the contrary, it
entrusts the court with “hear[ing] and determin[ing]” that issue “[i]f no jury
trial be demanded by the party alleged to be in default.”121 Moreover, there
is a simple explanation for § 4’s preoccupation with jury trials. As noted,
Cohen modeled the FAA on New York’s arbitration law. Section 3 of the
New York statute, which served as the blueprint for § 4 of the FAA,
declared that if a party demanded a jury trial about the “making” of the
arbitration clause, the judge should submit the matter “to a jury in the
manner provided by law for referring to a jury issues in an equity action.”122
By doing so, it preserved an important feature of New York’s Code of Civil
Procedure: the ability of parties to request a jury trial for equitable
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defenses.123 Eliminating this entitlement would have raised a serious
constitutional problem.124 So, the New York statute (in a paragraph the FAA
copied wholesale) took pains to give juries an active role in challenges to
the “making” of the arbitration clause. Thus, the fact that § 4 refers
repeatedly to jury trials is a holdover from the New York statute, not
evidence of Congress’s intent to foreclose courts from entertaining
equitable defenses such as unconscionability.
3. Modern Unconscionability and Formation.—Finally, suppose that
the anti-court and anti-unconscionability theories are correct that only
defenses that hinge on the “making” of the arbitration clause fall within § 4
(or § 2). As I have argued above, modern unconscionability does, in fact,
revolve around contract formation. Indeed, modern unconscionability
reflects the fact that “gross inequality of bargaining power, together with
terms unreasonably favorable to the stronger party, may confirm . . . that the
weaker party . . . did not in fact assent or appear to assent to the unfair
terms.”125 Under their own logic, then, the anti-court and antiunconscionability theories do not remove unconscionability from the
judicial arsenal.
This conclusion is true even for the very application of the
unconscionability doctrine that Justice Thomas found to be preempted in
Concepcion. Citing a passage in Discover Bank in which the California
Supreme Court explained that class arbitration waivers can reduce the
drafter’s liability, Justice Thomas reasoned that “[e]xculpatory contracts are
a paradigmatic example of contracts that will not be enforced because of
public policy.”126 He thus concluded that the state high court’s holding does
not revolve around the “making” of the arbitration clause. But there is a
second, well-established reason that courts strike down exculpatory clauses
in adhesion contracts: because they are “wanting in the element of
voluntary assent.”127 Indeed, in Tunkl v. Regents of University of California,
a case that served as the springboard for Discover Bank, the California
Supreme Court noted that when a liability waiver appears in an adhesion
contract, “the releasing party does not really acquiesce voluntarily in the
123
See, e.g., Bernard E. Gegan, Is There a Constitutional Right to Jury Trial of Equitable Defenses
in ew York?, 74 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 21–28 (2000) (noting that New York courts allowed defendants
to try equitable defenses to juries if the plaintiff sought relief at law).
124
See id. at 1–3.
125
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d (1981); see also id. § 211 cmt. c (noting
that because customers only “assent[] to a few terms,” standard forms are subject to “the power of the
court to refuse to enforce an unconscionable contract or term”). Justice Thomas may not disagree with
this general sentiment. See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 249 (1995) (plurality opinion)
(O’Connor, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[A] determination that a
contract is ‘unconscionable’ may in fact be a determination that one party did not intend to agree to the
terms of the contract.”).
126
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1756 (2011) (Thomas, J., concurring in
the judgment).
127
The Kensington, 183 U.S. 263, 268 (1902).
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contractual shifting of the risk.”128 Thus, if Discover Bank had simply
pointed out that consumers are unlikely to notice, understand, or agree to
class arbitration waivers, Justice Thomas could not have found it to be
preempted. At most, then, the anti-court and anti-unconscionability theories
will change the rhetoric that judges employ, rather than the results they
reach.
CONCLUSION
The anti-court and anti-unconscionability theories are not convincing
interpretations of the FAA. The anti-court theory would make
unconscionable arbitration clauses self-enforcing—a result that is both
illogical and undesirable. The anti-unconscionability theory takes an unduly
narrow view of § 2. Courts should reject these attempts to eliminate their
role as a vital check on unfairness in arbitration.
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